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ABSTRACT
This paper introduces a multi-agent dynamical system of
the interaction between electricity consumers, the elec-
tricity distribution system operator, and the technological
(generation, storage) and regulatory (tariff design, incen-
tive schemes) environments. For any type of environment,
our dynamical system simulates the evolution of the de-
ployment of distributed electricity generation, as well as
the evolution of the cost of distribution. The system relies
on the assumption that individual electricity consumers be-
have statistically as rational agents, who may invest in op-
timised distributed renewable energy installations, if they
are cost-efficient compared to the retail electricity tariff.
The deployment of these installations induces a change
in the aggregated net consumption and generation of the
users of a distribution network. By modelling the cost re-
covery mechanism of the distribution system operator, the
system simulates the evolution of the retail electricity tariff
in response to such a change in the aggregated consump-
tion and production.
INTRODUCTION
The integration of distributed electricity generation tech-
nologies (DRE), such as solar photovoltaic panels (PV),
into the distribution networks (DN) has been made possible
by the use of incentive schemes, as these technologies used
to be less economically competitive than conventional ones
[1]. The inclusion of a sizeable amount of DRE installa-
tions, nonetheless, may cause severe strain on the distribu-
tion systems, since they are not engineered to absorb large
amounts of distributed generation (DG) [2]. The nature of
the strain imposed on the system can be multifaceted, and
may stem from technical problems such as over-voltages
in the low voltage distribution system [3], or regulatory
problems including the over-compensation of DRE owners
and the potential failure of the cost recovery mechanisms
of the distribution system operators (DSO) [4].
In our work, we aim at creating a methodology for test-
ing the impact of any regulatory and technological environ-
ments on the deployment of DRE installations and on the
distribution component of the retail electricity tariff (sim-
ply distribution tariff from now on). The methodology we
describe in this paper is based on a multi-agent discrete-
time dynamical system formalisation, in which the agents
interact with an environment. On the one hand, the agents
of such a system are the DRE owners, the non-DRE ow-
ners, and a (unique) DSO. On the other hand, the environ-
ment (the DN), is composed of a set of rules including the
aforementioned incentive schemes, the tariff design of the
DN (e.g. volumetric tariffs or capacity tariffs), and the cost
of distributed generation and storage technologies.
The purpose of this paper is to describe and test this
methodology. In particular, our main contributions are the
following:
• We provide a description of our multi-agent discrete-
time dynamical system formalisation, used to simulate
the evolution of an electricity distribution system by mo-
delling the interactions of individual agents (DRE ow-
ners, non-DRE owners, and DSO), with the environ-
ment. This is presented in the Methodology section.
• We introduce a test case in which we compare different
incentive schemes. In particular we compare two dis-
tinct compensation mechanisms (net-metering and net-
purchasing) as described in [5]. This is explained in de-
tail in the Test Case section.
METHODOLOGY
In this section we elaborate on the modelling of our multi-
agent discrete-time dynamical system. The purpose of
such a system is to evaluate, over a given time horizon,
and for any environment,
1. the impact of the environment on the rate of adoption of
DRE installations; and
2. the impact of the penetration of a significant amount of
DRE installations on the distribution tariff.
The result of the first evaluation impacts the second one,
which in turn also influences the first evaluation at the sub-
sequent time step, through a feedback mechanism.
In the proposed approach, electricity consumers, interact-
ing with a unique DN, are modelled as rational agents that
may invest in optimally sized grid-tied DRE installations
if these are cost-efficient compared to the retail electricity
tariff. Moreover, the distribution tariff is adapted accor-
ding to the evolution of DRE generation within the DN.
In this framework, three distinct components defining the
behaviour of the agents: (i) the optimisation of DRE units,
(ii) the investment decision process, and (iii) the computa-
tion of the distribution tariff. As a reminder, the agents are
the DSO and the users of the DN. There are two distinct
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groups of users: group A which denotes the users who may
deploy a DRE installation, and group B, which comprises
the users who cannot invest in a DRE installation due to
technical or economic constraints. The latter is therefore
left out of the two first components (optimisation and in-
vestment decision), since these two, as discussed below,
assign the optimal sizing configuration and the investment
decision on DRE installations.
Our multi-agent discrete-time dynamical system works as
follows. At the initialisation of the system, we assume
zero installed DRE capacity for all users. Then, at every
time-step, and assuming a tariff design based on volumes
of energy traded, the system updates the proportion of con-
sumers who have deployed a DRE installation, as well as
the distribution tariff. The detailed work flow of the model
is represented by a data flow diagram in Figure 1, and the
full description of this multi-agent system, including the
code, can be found in [6]. The three components are des-
cribed in the following.
Optimisation of DRE units
As represented in Figure 1, all potential DRE installations
(group A) are optimised following the first component of
the multi-agent system. Assuming that the storage dyna-
mics and the investment costs of the DRE can be described
by linear mappings, we formalise this optimisation pro-
blem as a linear program (LP). The inputs of this LP com-
prise the consumption and the potential production profiles
of each individual agent, as well as several parameters that
are user-independent (i.e. the same for all the users). These
parameters are the prices of PV and battery, the retail elec-
tricity tariff at every time-step, and the efficiency, the depth
of discharge and the lifetime of the batteries. The potential
DRE installations are optimised so as to minimise their le-
velized cost of electricity (LCOE). Thus, the resolution of
this optimisation problem outputs the optimal sizing con-
figuration (PV and battery capacities) that leads to a min-
imised LCOE, as well as the LCOE, which is the objective
function. We use a standard definition of the LCOE in this
model: the average total cost to deploy and operate a DRE
installation, divided by the total energy consumed by the
user over the project lifetime. The LCOE is formulated









where the capex are represented by i0, the yearly opex at
year y are ξy, the yearly demand at year y is defined as dy,
and r represents the discount rate. Finally, the lifetime of
the DRE installations (i.e. the optimisation horizon of this
LP) is set to Y years. Note that this horizon is not the same
as the horizon over which the evolution of the multi-agent
discrete-time dynamical system is studied.
Investment decision process
This component is used to decide, for each individual agent
in group A, whether to deploy a DRE installation with the
optimised sizing configuration indicated by the DRE opti-
misation. To model such a decision making process, we
make use of a price ratio between the optimised LCOE of
each agent, and the retail electricity tariff at every time-
step of the dynamical system. Such a price ratio, denoted
by Γ, will adopt a value in [0,1], since the LCOE of the
DRE installations cannot be greater than the retail elec-
tricity tariff due to optimality constraints (since the DRE
installations are grid-tied, the feasible region of the opti-
misation problem is upper bounded by the retail electricity
tariff). Then, by using a Bernoulli distribution in which the
probability p is a linear function of the computed Γ, the in-
vestment decision can be controlled by a random variable
β drawn from the distribution B(1, p), where β ∈ {0,1} by
definition of the Bernoulli distribution. According to such
a linear function, low values of Γ (i.e. when the LCOE
of the optimised DRE unit is of reduced proportions com-
pared to the retail tariff) result in high probability p of
drawing a variable β = 1, which indicates a positive invest-
ment decision. Similarly, when Γ is high, the probability
of drawing a variable β = 0 will be high, suggesting a neg-
ative investment decision for the agent. Finally, when all of
the possible investment decisions have been computed for
all of the individual agents, those agents whose investment
decision is positive are prevented from investing in the sub-
sequent time-steps. Hence, in our simulator, the possibility
of expanding an installation after its initial deployment is
not permitted.
Modelling the investment decision-making process in such
fashion ensures the deployment of some DRE units even
when the viability of the DRE installations lie at the eco-
nomically feasible limit (for instance when the PV prices
are high or the retail electricity tariff is low), represen-
ting the behaviour of those users who are eager to in-
vest. Likewise, this investment decision-making mecha-
nism will prevent some agents from investing even under
favourable conditions, representing those agents more re-
luctant to invest.
Computation of the distribution tariff
Finally, in our multi-agent system, an overall demand re-
duction in the DN might occur as a result of the progressive
deployment of DRE units, which self-consume part of their
electricity needs. Assuming that the revenues obtained by
the DSO are computed as a monotonically non-decreasing
function of the energy charged to the users, this overall
demand reduction will cause a loss in revenue, inducing a
need for adjusting the distribution tariff to offset the losses.
To adjust the distribution tariff, the following inputs are re-
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quired: the net consumption of all the agents of the DN
(groups A and B), and the retail electricity tariff at every
time-step of the dynamical system. Then, we represent
the cost recovery scheme of the DSO at every time-step
by computing the potential economic imbalances created
by the DRE installations deployed within the DN. If the
revenue of the DSO at a particular time t does not match
its incurred costs (assumed constant over the simulation
horizon), an economic imbalance appears (which can be
positive or negative). Thus, the adjustment of the distri-
bution tariff must account for both the potential imbalance
and the gradual aggregated net demand reduction in the




∀t ∈ {1, . . . ,T} (2)
where Π(dis)t+1 is the distribution tariff of the next period, C
are the incurred costs of the DSO, ∆t represents the imba-
lance between costs and revenues at period t, and D̂t+1 is
the expected aggregated demand (kWh) of the next period.
TEST CASE
To illustrate the functioning of our multi-agent system, an
example inspired by the current regulation policy in the
Walloon region of Belgium is presented in this section.
Hence, a tariff design based on volumes of energy traded
(paid in e/kWh) is considered. Moreover, to test diffe-
rent environments, we use three distinct incentive schemes,
based on the choice of compensation mechanism (the
manner electricity traded between the DRE and the grid
is recorded). The compensation mechanisms considered
are: (a) net-metering (NM): this system consists of one
meter that records imports (DRE← Grid) by running for-
wards, and exports (DRE→ Grid) by running backwards,
therefore, this means that both directions are assigned with
the same monetary value, namely the retail electricity ta-
riff; and (b) net-purchasing (NP): this option consists of
two independent meters for imports and exports, in this
setting imports are paid for at retail electricity tariff, and
exports are paid at a selling price (SP). With NM the total
exports are upper bounded by the total imports, however,
with NP there is no upper limit. The three evaluated cases
are: (i) NM, (ii) NP SP=0.04e, and (iii) NP SP=0.08e.
In the three cases the retail electricity tariff is initially set
to 0.22e.
At every time-step of the multi-agent system simulation,
we keep track of the deployed DRE units, and of the dis-
tribution tariff adjustment. Thus, we can compute the evo-
lution of the system in terms of rate of DRE deployment
and distribution tariff evolution. The results of the testing
of the multi-agent system with the three different environ-
ments are summarised in Figure 2.
This figure depicts the two metrics considered: evolution
Figure 1: Data flow diagram of the proposed multi-agent
system. The flow of actions occurs from top to bottom. The
individual users of group A, characterised by their load,
undergo an optimisation. The optimisation requires the
technology costs, the tariff design, and the retail electri-
city tariff, as well as the user load. The individual results
of the optimisation are used by the investment decision
model, which compares the LCOE of the individually opti-
mised installations with the retail tariff, yielding a positive
or negative investment decision for each potential installa-
tion. Finally, the revenues derived from the aggregated net
consumption of all users of group A and of group B are
compared with the (fixed) DSO costs, and the distribution
cost is updated.
of distribution tariff (left axis) and evolution of DRE de-
ployment (right axis), for the three cases. Regarding the
distribution tariff, we observe a similar 0.02e increase for
cases (i) and (ii) after 10 years, due to the loss of revenue of
the DSO in both cases, derived from the DRE deployment.
This indicates that both cases are more inefficient distri-
buting the DSO costs than case (iii). As for the DRE de-
ployment, we can observe a greater deployment for cases
(i) and (iii) both in the trend and in the final outcome after
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Figure 2: Evolution of the distribution tariff (left axis) and
evolution of DRE deployment (right axis). The deployment
of DRE units induces an increase in the distribution ta-
riff. Such an increase features a different extent depending
on the environment (composed of tariff design, incentive
scheme, and technology cost).
the simulated period, than for case (ii). This suggests that
case (ii) is outperformed in terms of DRE deployment fos-
tering by cases (i) and (iii). These distinct behaviours can
be explained, case by case, by the optimal solution iden-
tified by the optimisation of DRE units component of the
multi-agent discrete-time dynamical system:
• Case (i): with this environment, it results optimal to im-
port and export the same volume of electricity so that
the electricity bill is reduced (netting 0 kWh consumed).
This leads to installations without batteries (since sto-
rage and grid are perfect substitutes). Eventually with
this setting the DRE owners will not compensate the
DSO for their grid use.
• Case (ii): with this environment, imports must be re-
duced to decrease the bill, leading to highly autonomous
installations (large PV + battery capacities). Eventually
with this setting the DRE units will become completely
independent.
• Case (iii): by increasing the SP with respect to the pre-
vious case, the DRE owners business case is to become
electricity producers, selling it to offset their electricity
bills. This leads to installations with large PV capacites
as well as some storage. With this setting the DRE ow-
ners still pay the DSO for their grid use, since they rely
on it during periods with low PV production.
CONCLUSION
This paper has presented a multi-agent discrete-time dy-
namical system to describe the interaction between the dis-
tribution networks and the consumers. In such a system: (i)
electricity consumers interacting with a single distribution
network are modelled as rational agents that may invest in
optimised distributed renewable energy installations; and
(ii) the distribution tariff is adapted according to the evo-
lution of the DSO’s revenues, depending on the distributed
renewable energy that is produced and consumed in the
distribution network.
To illustrate the performance of the multi-agent system,
we have designed and simulated three different scenarios,
starting with the current regulation in the Walloon region
of Belgium, and further exploring other incentive schemes.
The simulator allows to illustrate the impact of the regula-
tion policies on many aspects: (i) the evolution of the elec-
tricity distribution tariff, and with it, the evolution of the
retail electricity tariff; (ii) the evolution of DRE deploy-
ment; and (iii) the optimised configurations of distributed
renewable energy installations in terms of production and
storage capacities.
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